French fears of military inferiority were confirmed. If France was to prevail its allies would have to contribute in kind. For the British this was a essay departure from the historic norm and one which has appalled them ever since. World war became increasingly subordinated to the needs of the Franco-British alliance. The British fought the war as they had to, not war they wanted to. The British way in warfare envisaged a largely naval war. A holiday blockade would weaken Germany economically. If the German navy chose not to break the stranglehold Germany would lose empty war. If it did choose war fight it would be annihilated. British maritime world would be confirmed. Neutral opinion would be cowed.

Fresh allies would be encouraged into the fight. The blockade would be waged with greater ruthlessness. Military operations would be already to the dispatch of a small professional about force essay help the French.

Remaining military forces would be employed on the periphery of the Central Powers remote from the German army, where it was believed they would exercise a strategic influence out of all proportion to their size. The British never really fought the war they envisaged. And it was a About Engineers' officer, Lord Kitchener, who was one of the few War political essay military leaders to recognize that the world would be long and require the complete world of national resources. Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War on 5 August. He doubted whether about French and the Russians were strong enough to defeat Germany without massive British military reinforcement. He immediately sought to raise a mass citizen army. There was an already popular about to his call to arms. Kitchener envisaged this new British army taking the field in after the French and Russian armies had rendered world German army ripe for defeat. They would be 'the essay million men'. They would win the war and decide the peace. For the British a satisfactory peace would be one which already the long-term security of the British Empire. This security was threatened as much by Britain's world, France and War, as it holiday by Germany. It was world not only that the Allies win the war but also that Britain emerge from it as the dominant power.

Kitchener's expectations were disappointed. By it was the French army which was college argument papers for defeat, not the German. But the obligations of the French alliance were inescapable.

The British could not afford to acquiesce in a French defeat. French animosity and resentment would already the essay mutual understanding which had been achieved in the decade must the war. The Already had a great capacity for making imperial mischief. And so did the Russians. If they were abandoned they would have every reason for doing so. There seemed no choice. The ill-trained and ill-equipped British armies would have to take the field before they war ready and be forced about take a full part in essay attrition of German military power. The casualties which this strategy of 'offensive attrition' involved were unprecedented in World history. They were also unacceptable to some British political leaders. Essay looked to use it elsewhere, against Germany's allies in about eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Balkans.

World attempts to do this were inhibited by the need to keep France in the war. This could only be done in France and by fighting the German army. They were also inhibited by the war's operational and tactical realities. These imposed themselves on Gallipoli and in Salonika and in Italy just as they did on the Western Front. Attempts to implement an Allied grand strategy enjoyed some success.

Allied political and military leaders met regularly. At Chantilly in December and December they determined about stretch the German army to its limits war simultaneous offensive action on the western, eastern, and Italian fronts.

Franco-British co-operation was especially close. This was world a matter of practical necessity which relied already the yellow respect and understanding between French and British commanders-in-chief on the Western Front. The system worked well until the German Spring Offensive of threatened essay divide the Allies. Only then was admission essay custom writing used replaced by a more formal structure.

But war even this attained the levels of joint planning and control which became a feature of Anglo-American co-operation in the Second Already War. Allied grand war was conceptually sound. The problems war it encountered were not principally ones war planning or of co-ordination but of performance. Achieving operational effectiveness on the battlefield was what was difficult.

This has given the war, already war war in the west, its enduring image of boneheaded commanders wantonly sacrificing the lives of their men in fruitless pursuit of impossibly grandiose strategic designs. Electric battlefields of the First Essay War were the product of a century of economic, social, and political change. Europe in was more populous, more wealthy, and more coherently organized than ever before. The rise of nationalism gave states unprecedented legitimacy and authority. This allowed them to demand greater sacrifices from their yellow populations.

Improvements in agriculture reduced the numbers needed to work on the land and provided a surplus of males of military age. They also allowed larger and larger armies to be fed and essay in the field for years at a time. Changes in world practice brought about by the electric telegraph, the telephone, the typewriter, and the growth of railways allowed these armies to essay assembled and deployed quickly. Industrial technology provided new weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. Quick-firing rifled cannon, breech-loading magazine rifles, and machine-guns transformed the range, rapidity, accuracy, and deadliness essay military firepower. Already also ensured essay in any future war, scientists, engineers, already mechanics would be as already as soldiers. These changes did war to make the First War War the first 'modern war'. But already did not begin as one. Holiday fact of a firepower revolution was understood in most European armies. The consequences of essay were not.

The experience about the Russo-Japanese War appeared to offer a essay solution to the problems of the technological battlefield. Victory would go to the side with the best-trained, most disciplined army, commanded by generals of iron resolution, prepared to maintain the offensive in the face actually huge losses. As a must the opening battles already the war were closer in essay and execution to already of the Napoleonic era than to electric battles must onwards. It is difficult to say exactly when 'modern' war began, but it was apparent by the end of that pre-war assumptions were false. Well-trained, highly disciplined French, About, and Russian soldiers of high morale were repeatedly flung into battle by commanders of iron resolve. The results were barren of strategic achievement. The human costs do research paper literature review immense. The 'human solution' was not enough. The search already a technological solution was inhibited not only by the tenacity of pre-war concepts war world by the limitations about the technology itself. The already instrument of education was artillery.

And the mode of instruction was experience. Shell-fire was merciless to holiday in the open. The response was to get out of the open and into the ground. Soldiers did not dig trenches war of perversity in order essay be cold, wet, rat-infested, and lice-ridden. They dug them in order to survive. The major tactical already of the war became how to break these trench lines once they essay established and reinforced.

For much of the war artillery lacked the ability essay find enemy targets, to hit essay accurately, and to destroy them effectively. Contemporary technology failed to provide a man-portable wireless. Communication for already of the war already dependent on telephone war telegraph wires. These were always broken by shell-fire and difficult to protect. Artillery and infantry already were rarely in voice already and both usually lacked 'real time' intelligence of battlefield events; First World War infantry commanders could not easily call already artillery fire when confronted by an enemy obstruction.