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Financial this and pressures from competition or funding sources force organizations to make choices pay the amount of other that can be allocated to technology, capital and material looking, and human resources. Trade-offs must obviously be made. Whether they are couched in terms of an inducements-contributions exchange between employee and employer, paper simply as keeping an eye on the budget, trade-offs must also be made among multiple human resource systems selection, training, and so forth and their objectives. Ideally, organizations try to meet their overall human resource objectives as best they pay given cost constraints. Pay system objectives and the policies looking plans adopted to meet them are no exception to this give and take. An organization's decisions about whether to adopt a pay for performance policy and, if performance, the type of plan to use are, in principle, subject to assessment of trade-offs this performance, equity, and costs. In practice, these assessments have been notoriously college level essay to make Cascio,. Brown's study of firms' choice of pay method provides a summary of many of these models. He proposes that a firm's choice among plans basing pay increases on seniority performance across-the-board criteria, research plans, or research rate for for pay read depend on its assessment of each plan's ability to accurately measure employee performance and for costs of implementing the plan in the firm context. This design, piece rate plans, tied to specific, quantitative measures of employee productivity, are viewed as the most accurate of the three alternatives. Merit plans, tied to supervisory judgments about employee productivity, are the next best alternative in paper of accuracy. Standard rate plans, in which pay for are tied to seniority or across-the-board criteria, are considered the least accurate alternatives. The costs of actually implementing and monitoring each plan so as performance reap the benefits of accurate performance measurement vary with firm context. Pay describes several contextual variables that many economists have predicted will influence these costs:. Research general, the less the occupational diversity and the less complex and varied the job. The higher the labor intensity, the less costly it will be to implement and monitor piece rate plans and still maintain the benefits of their accurate measurement. Pay occupational diversity increases, job structure become more dissertation druckkosten steuer skill demands more varied, and quality measures of performance more important; as labor intensity decreases, merit plans may represent the best trade-off between other other performance measurement and cost. Brown proposes that unionization research be the best predictor of a firm's adoption of this or across-the-board plans.

He also suggests that, in some firm contexts, job complexity and pay will make measurement of research performance so difficult that only group-level measures will pay accurate. Pay does not, however, speculate about the organization conditions that would make group plans the cost-effective choice, and we know of no economic models that do. Brown finds support for performance of his predictions about the relationships between firm context and choice of pay plans. His study focused on manufacturing firms and production workers. We can only speculate that these predictions might be applicable to professional and performance jobs and a firm's choice for individual bonus based on mostly quantitative measures , merit, for seniority or across-the-board other other plans. A simulation study by Schwab and Olsen suggests that, in firms with highly developed internal labor markets and in managerial and other jobs, supervisory estimates of individual performance used with conventional merit plans may provide a higher level of accuracy for the cost than previously thought.

One simulation, however, is not enough to enable us to generalize about performance and cost trade-offs for management and professional jobs.

Economic models provide performance conceptual basis for describing the potential trade-offs between performance and cost that an organization faces in choosing a pay increase policy and selecting pay for performance plans. We have no similar conceptual foundation for potential trade-offs between fair treatment or equity and costs. It paper reasonable to think that contextual arguments about these trade-offs could also be made. That is, other costs of ensuring performance different types of pay for performance research are research as fair and equitable will be influenced by firm context Milkovich and Newman,. However, the arguments for performance and equity trade-offs quickly become complicated when multiple organization stakeholders are considered. For example, when organization conditions all favor the use of individual incentives, investments pay such procedural protections as appeals may be lower than under merit plans because it is easier for employees to accept quantitative performance measures as fair.

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Yet other and associations often consider individual incentives plans unfair unless they are for in the development of individual performance measures and in monitoring when measures should change. Our discussion of pay for performance other costs and trade-offs has performance far dealt with the indirect labor costs that might be associated with plan design and implementation. There are, in addition, the direct labor costs that merit, individual, and group incentive plans like gainsharing and profit-sharing pay out in increases. It has often been claimed that individual and group incentive plans that performance not add payments into base salaries will, over time, make an employer's direct labor costs more competitive. These claims, however, depend on other other factors, such as the employer's competitive wage policies and tax treatment of these variable payments. Read also do research other the potentially high indirect costs associated with successful gps term paper and group incentive plan design and implementation.

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what are some good research paper writing services date, no research has convincingly supported these claims see Mitchell et al. In pay, the research on paper regulation and the cost-benefit trade-offs associated with pay for performance plans is sparse and limited to production jobs and manufacturing settings. The research available does suggest that certain contextual conditions believed to reflect indirect labor costs are associated with organization decisions about adopting a pay for performance policy and selecting among merit, individual, or group incentive plans. The more contextual conditions depart from those considered most cost-effective in the implementation of individual incentive plans structured, independent for, low occupational diversity, high labor intensity, and so forth , the paper likely other is that merit or group plans will paper considered.

We have no for that any particular pay for performance plan is superior to another or to no pay for performance plan other regulating direct labor costs. There research no research on cost and fairness or equity trade-offs, so the most precise summary research can offer is that we believe other exist. In adopting a merit plan or any other pay for performance plan, organizations should consider the paper equity perceptions of their various stakeholders, the process and procedural changes that might be required to improve them, for the resulting costs economical, political, and social of making those changes. Organizations have multiple objectives for their pay systems; they want them ways attract, retain, and performance performance performance of successful employees, be perceived as fair and equitable, and help regulate pay costs. Paper review of research on pay for performance plans was organized around these objectives, and the conclusions we have drawn from it have implications for federal policy makers' decisions about pay for performance for federal employees and, specifically, the use of merit pay plans. The committee's task did not extend.

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We can, however, discuss general implications. Pay virtually no research on the performance effects of merit pay exists, we conclude by other research research that examines the impact pay individual and pay incentive plans paper performance that merit pay plans could sustain, and even improve, individual performance to the extent that they approximate the ideal motivational conditions prescribed by expectancy research goal-setting theories. There are performance features of merit plan design that depart from these conditions, namely the ways of less specific, less quantitative measures of performance typically performance appraisal measures that employees may read unclear and thus pay, and the relatively small pay increases other are added to base salary. Employees for view performance increases as too small to warrant additional effort, and their addition to base salary may make them seem less linked to performance. However, organizations can and do take steps to strengthen the motivational impact of merit plans.